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China’s Agrarian Reform and the Privatization of Land: A Contrarian View 
 
Abstract 
 Many media and scholars outside China are advocating for the privatization of land 
ownership in China, claiming it to be a necessary step before China can transform its agriculture 
into large-scale, market-oriented and technology-intensive modern agriculture. Chinese scholars 
advocating land privatization, on the other hand, typically argue that land privatization would 
offer farmers more protection of their rights. In this paper, we present a contrarian view to these 
calls for land privatization published in both mainstream media and academic journals. We argue 
that, under China’s current system of collective land ownership and individualized land use rights, 
the aforementioned goals can be achieved. In fact, under the current system, not only 
modernization of agriculture has proceeded rapidly in China, it did so in a fashion that avoided 
many downsides of privatization. Land privatization, in our view, would only exacerbate class 
inequality and social tension in rural China and weaken farmers’ positions in their dealings with 
more powerful actors. We compare the effects of these two approaches in five areas to show that 
strengthening the current system is superior to privatizing rural land: increasing investment in 
land and agricultural productivity, promoting scaled-up, modern agriculture, protecting farmer’s 
land rights and preventing land grabs, allowing farmers to use land as collateral to obtain loans, 
and, speeding up migration and facilitating rural migrants’ integration into cities.  
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The modernization of agriculture in any country implies scaling up, mechanizing 
production, improving the efficiency of marketing, encouraging rural residents to shift to the city, 
and putting the land in the hands of those who can use it more productively. That is one of the 
reasons why, when in the early 1980s China’s government broke up rural communes and granted 
individual farming households land use rights to tiny plots of land, critics from ideological left, 
right and center lamented the shrinking in scale. To them, this represented an unacceptable step 
backward for the development of China’s agriculture system. As it turned out, the measures 
worked to reduce rural poverty and, for a time, improve agricultural production. However, now 
that production growth has diminished, some scholars point to China’s small-scale and backward 
agricultural production system as a major barrier to the country’s rural modernization.  
For this reason, many looked to a major party meeting in 2008, the Third Plenary Session 
of the Seventeenth Communist Party Central Committee, as a possible watershed. Even before the 
government released information about the contents of the meeting report on reform of China’s 
agriculture (the final version of the report was not released until October 19, nearly a week after 
the Plenum’s completion), speculation – subsequently shown to be unfounded – proliferated. 
Within this torrent of conjecture and hearsay, a number of misleading and even erroneous news 
reports emerged from respected international media outlets. These centered on rumors that China 
would at last allow, if not the outright privatization of land, then at least its equivalent – 
permitting, for the first time, ordinary Chinese farmers to sell their land use rights to others, and 
to use the land as collateral for loans.1 This, according to many reports, would shift Chinese 
                                                 
1
 See for example, Edward Wong, ‘China May Allow Sale of Rural Land Rights’, New York 
Times (10 October 2008); David Stanway, ‘Radical Reforms to set China's Farmers Free’, The 
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agriculture out of subsistence farming and encourage the scaling up of production. In addition to 
Western journalists, a number of scholars and other China watchers enthused that moves to 
privatize property rights would benefit China and her farmers. For instance, Zhu Keliang of the 
Rural Development Institute, for one, noted in the wake of the plenum, “If all the speculations are 
true, if senior leadership is going to lift all the restrictions out the door, I’d say this is a great 
positive. It’ll free up the dead capital and allow all this wealth to materialize.” Zhu added that 
such a change would give China “huge momentum in terms of agricultural development.” 
Eminent economist D. Gale Johnson has proposed land titling as a way to liberate Chinese 
peasants from abuse of power by local elites. Scott Rozelle, a leading expert on China’s 
agricultural enthused, “This is potentially the real deal… [if enacted] it gives a household a very 
valuable asset that it can collateralize or sell.”2 Within China, land privatization remains a 
politically sensitive issue, and calls for land privatization are often not openly published. 
Nonetheless, a number of prominent scholars including the prominent reformer and economist 
                                                                                                                                                               
Guardian, (13 October 2008); Rosemary Righter, ‘The Fat Lady Sings in China's Opera of 
Reform’, Times of London, (20 October 2008). 
2
 Roy L. Prosterman, Mary N. Temple, and Timothy Hanstad, ‘China: A Fieldwork-Based 
Appraisal of the Household Responsibility System’, in Roy L. Prosterman, ed., Agrarian Reform 
and Grassroots Development, (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990), pp 103-38; D. Gale 
Johnson, ‘Property Rights in Rural China’, Chicago 1995, University of Chicago; Scott Rozelle 
quoted in Mark Magnier, “China Outlines Land Reform Plan,” Los Angeles Times, (20 October 
2008). For other western-based academics arguing for privatization, see Tony Saich, ‘China in 
2006: Focus on Social Development,’ Asian Survey 47(1), (2007), pp. 32-43; Cheng Li. ‘Hu's 
Policy Shift and the Tuanpai's Coming-of-Age’, China Leadership Monitor 15 (2005). 
 5
Gao Shangquan, legal scholar Yu Jiangrong and Tsinghua University historian Qin Hui lend their 
voices to the cause of land privatization, typically arguing that doing so would benefit millions of 
Chinese rural residents.3  
Meanwhile, just as China reached this crossroad regarding land ownership, almost 
unnoticed, the structure of the country’s agriculture has shifted, bringing with it many of the gains 
advocates of privatization would like to see, without the disruptive changes in the land use rights 
that privatization’s proponents propose. We argue that these fundamental alterations in China’s 
agriculture sector not only remove primary justifications for land privatization, but form a model 
that other countries can consider to both empower small-land owners and scale-up production. 
Moreover, in contrast to much received wisdom, allowing the sale (as opposed to the rental) of 
land use rights, or moves to otherwise privatize China’s land ownership, would likely return 
China to days of relatively large land ownership and large numbers of landless farmers. 
Exploitation by landlords and leaders would resume as the dominant form of class relations in 
rural China.  
 
Rural China’s Land System and Its Discontents 
Understanding the debate over land ownership in China requires a brief introduction to the 
current land system in the People’s Republic of China, and the development of the institution of 
                                                 
3
 Joseph Fewsmith, ‘Tacking the Land Issue – Carefully’, China Leadership Monitor 27, (2008), 
pp. 1-8; Hui Qin, ‘Nongmin diquan liulun’ (Six Comments on Farmers’ Land Rights), Shehui 
Kexue Luntan (Tribune of Social Sciences) 9, (2007), pp. 122-46. 
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land use rights.4 Land in China is divided into urban and rural land. While urban land is state 
owned, rural land is actually owned by neither the central state nor China’s farmers themselves, 
but rather by rural collectives – administrative villages with leaders selected through open 
elections (much of it conducted imperfectly). Within rural China, the land system has been based 
for nearly three decades on a dual track system that divides ownership from usage.  Usage rights, 
meaning the right to use and derive income from – but not individually own – the land, were 
allocated to each rural household on a relatively equitable basis, starting in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Under this dual system of collective land ownership and individualized land rights, 
Chinese farmers’ access to collectively owned land became an entitlement, based on their 
membership in rural villages. This entitlement was economically inalienable – farmers would not 
be stripped of their land rights no matter how poor they were or how much debt they had. 
Subsequently, the state devolved farming decisions that it had previously made, such as what to 
plant and whom to sell it to, to the farmer.5 These reforms, labeled the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS), spread quickly throughout the countryside despite skepticism and even hostility 
on the part of many Chinese leaders. The combination of market forces and government policies 
increased rural incomes so rapidly that hundreds of millions of farmers emerged from poverty, 
                                                 
4
 For more details on the system, see for example Peter Ho, ‘Who Owns China's Land? Property 
Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity’, The China Quarterly (166), (2001), pp. 394-421.  
5
 Jonathan Unger, ‘Chapter 5: Disbanding Collective Agriculture’, in Jonathan Unger, ed., The 
Transformation of Rural China, (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2002), pp. 95-118. 
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and, for a brief few years at least, the yawning gap between urban and rural incomes actually 
narrowed.6  
Today, it is in support of dismantling this dual system of collective ownership and 
individualized usage rights that advocates of land privatization are now writing. To these 
advocates, this land system is at the root of a series of problems that have plagued rural China in 
the reform era. Problems they cited include the miniscule scale of agricultural production and the 
low level of efficiency resulting from that, rural poverty, the lack of protection for farmer’s land 
rights, and the difficulties rural migrants face in integrating into cities. The solution to all these 
problems, they propose, is privatization of land – more specifically in rural China’s context, 
giving farmers the ownership over their land so that they can freely buy and sell land, or use land 
as collateral to secure loans.  
Many of these advocates had hoped that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would 
finally move toward privatizing rural land during the aforementioned Third Plenary meeting of 
the 17th Central Committee. However, the reforms that were actually announced, in contrast to 
such expectations and numerous news reports, will not fundamentally alter the collective 
ownership system.7 To the contrary, China’s President Hu Jintao, even before this Plenum, was at 
                                                 
6
 Martin Whyte, ‘Social Trends in China: The Triumph of Inequality?’, in A. Doak Barnett and 
Ralph N. Clough, ed., Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development, (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986), pp. 103-23. 
7
 China will continue and improve its rural basic economic system based on the Household 
Responsibility System, the communiqué said. See for instance ‘Right Decision Injects Life into 
Rural Reform’, Xinhua, (2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
10/17/content_10208686.htm and ‘China Extends Rural Reform and Development in New Party 
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pains to underscore that the dual track system would remain intact. During a visit to Xiaogang 
village in Anhui province in September 2008, a symbolically important village that had in the 
1970s been early pioneers, adopting a version of a land distribution system that later evolved into 
the HRS, Hu emphasized, 
“I would like to clearly tell you villagers that the two-tier management system that integrates 
unified with separate management on the basis of household contract management is the 
cornerstone for the party’s rural policies. Not only the current land contract relationship will 
remain stable and unchanged over a long time, greater and protected land contract and 
management right will be given to the peasants,”8 
The document that eventually emerged was consistent with Hu’s pledge. Thus, the implied 
changes that appeared in foreign media reports, such as the New York Times and The Guardian, 
apparently were incorrect. While China’s central government has recommitted itself to closing the 
gap in wages and income in rural and urban areas, it has pledged to do so under the current basic 
system of land ownership and usage rights. Party documents have emphasized several issues that 
the new steps are designed to address, including the minuscule scale of production that occurs on 
tiny plots of land allocated to farmers, as well as the lack of commercialization of many 
agricultural products. Some have concluded from this that China’s leadership was considering 
allowing farmers to sell their land. But the document that was released by the party heralded no 
new policies regarding shifting the ownership of land. Instead, it emphasized a set of goals 
                                                                                                                                                               
Document’, Xinhua, (2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
10/19/content_10220352.htm. 
8
 Quoted in Simon Elegant, ‘Rural Reform in China: Walking on Eggshells’, Time, (2008), time-
blog.com/china_blog/2008/10/rural_reform_in_china_treading.html. 
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designed to encourage rural development and promote farmers’ standards of living, while actually 
strengthening the current institutional framework.  
 
Debating the Merits of Land Privatization 
Advocates of liberalization contend that privatization would have a number of key 
advantages for China and her farmers. These include raising productivity and production 
efficiency, protecting the farmers’ rights to land, allowing scaled-up production, providing 
farmers access to capital, as well as freeing farmers from the land and helping them integrate into 
cities. Interestingly, the new central policy includes four central goals that are quite similar: 
raising agriculture production, protecting farmers’ rights, improving the welfare of farmers, and 
promoting urbanization and industrialization. Debate now centers on which system – a bolstered 
HRS or a more liberalized one – would better accomplish these goals. In contrast to the call of 
many analysts for the privatization of rural land, we agree with the central Chinese leadership that 
the best way to achieve these four goals is through modifying and strengthening the current 
system. Analyzing the two proposals – privatizing land rights or strengthening of the current 
system – will help us arbitrate this debate. 
 
Agricultural Productivity 
First, proponents of liberalizing land rights argue that allowing farmers to own, as well as 
buy and sell land, will increase overall agricultural productivity, in part by encouraging more 
investment, introducing modern inputs, mechanizing production, and increasing scale. Private 
systems ensure that productive assets end up in the hands of those that can use them most 
efficiently. Privatizing land will protect farmers, encouraging them to improve the quality of their 
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land and plan over longer time scales. If farmers find that their time would be more productively 
allocated to activities outside the land, they can sell their land to those who can better use it. This 
would help China address a major issue the nation faces – ensuring more productive use of its 
land and labor. 
 However, defenders of the HRS counter in a number of ways. First, in contrast to the 
perceptions of many, empirical research conducted by leading agricultural economists focusing 
on China indicates that the country’s total agricultural production has grown rapidly, especially in 
the early years of the HRS reform.9 Despite the miniscule scale of land, these data reveal that 
China’s grain production has reached a level of per capita output comparable to that in the most 
developed countries, thanks to continued technological innovation and extremely intensive labor 
input.10 Research has also rejected two causal mechanisms of privatization – decreased 
fragmentation and increased mechanization. Tan and his co-authors argue that changes in the 
number of plots has little affect on total production costs per unit of output and would only 
increase the number of surplus laborers.11 Finally, much research has disputed the notion that the 
mechanization of agriculture – one of the crucial advantages of increasing scale – would help 
                                                 
9
 Robert W. Mead, ‘A Revisionist View of Chinese Agricultural Productivity?’ Contemporary 
Economic Policy 21(1), (2003), pp. 117-131. 
10
 Scott Rozelle, Jikun Huang, and Keijiro Otsuka, ‘The Engines of a Viable Agriculture: 
Advances in Biotechnology, Market Accessibility and Land Rentals in Rural China’, China 
Journal 53, (2005), pp. 82-111.  
11
 Tan, Shuhao, Nico Heerink, Gideon Kruseman, and Futian Qu. 2008. "Do Fragmented 
Landholdings have Higher Production Costs? Evidence from Rice Farmers in Northeastern 
Jiangxi province, P.R. China." China Economic Review 19 (3):347-58. 
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increase production in an overpopulated rural China.12 The conclusion from studies on China that 
increasing scale of land will not increase overall productivity is consistent with the experiences of 
other developing countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers, where the inverse 
relationship between farm size and agriculture output has been well established.13 Thus, 
increasing the scale of farming by itself would not likely increase food production.  
Second, many argue against the idea that farmers would feel more secure with privatized 
property rights, and thus would be willing to invest more in the land through use of organic 
fertilizers or improving infrastructure. The length of tenure of a farmer over a particular piece of 
land does encourage one form of investment – the use of organic fertilizer. However, land 
security does not increase other forms of investments, such as digging wells, building roads and 
improving irrigation. These public goods are beyond the wherewithal of most households (with or 
without land security), and are thus primarily the purview of village governments. Moreover, the 
impact of increased use of organic fertilizer on agriculture production would be minimal – overall 
tenure guarantees increase production values by less than one percent.14 It is partly for the 
minimal expected effects of privatization on investment that two scholars conclude, “yield gains 
                                                 
12
 See for instance Zinan Liu and Juzhong Zhuang, ‘Determinants of Technical Efficiency in Post-
Collective Chinese Agriculture: Evidence from Farm-Level Data’, Journal of Comparative 
Economics 28(3), 2000, pp. 545-564. 
13
 For a discussion of this, see for instance Christopher B. Barrett, ‘On Price Risk and the Inverse 
Farm Size-Productivity Relationship’, Journal of Development Economics 51, (1996), pp. 193-
215. 
14
 Hanan G. Jacoby, Guo Li, and Scott Rozelle. ‘Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and 
Investment in Rural China’, American Economic Review 92(5), 2002, pp. 1420-47. 
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from increasing the length of tenure would probably be minimal, and privatization of land in 
China may not have a large immediate effect.”15 These findings are consistent with the results of 
surveys conducted by James K.S. Kung disputing the notion that farmers feel insecure with land 
use rights. This survey, consistent with the findings of a number of Chinese surveys, suggests 
instead that farmers prefer periodic land reallocations that adjust to population shifts, thus 
distributing land on a more egalitarian basis (“to each according to her needs”).16 The finding that 
reallocations occur more frequently after contested elections further supports the hypothesis that 
farmers generally support reallocation.17  
While China’s agriculture production could be more efficient (a separate issue that we 
discuss next), these findings indicate that privatization is unlikely to squeeze much more 
production out of China’s land. In light of the inverse relationship in China and elsewhere 
between farm size and total yield, privatization and other initiatives to increase farm size would 
be counterproductive. Certainly, much of China’s land is unproductive; the authors have both 
visited numerous rural areas facing hard land conditions that are unsuitable for agriculture 
                                                 
15
 Guo Li, Scott Rozelle and Jikun Huang, ‘Land Rights, Farmer Investment Incentives, and 
Agricultural Production in China’, University of California Davis, (2000), pp. 24-25. 
16
 James K.S. Kung, ‘Equal Entitlement versus Tenure Security under a Regime of Collective 
Property Rights: Peasants’ Preference for Institutions in Post-Reform Chinese Agriculture’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics 21, (1995), pp. 82-111. For the surveys conducted by Chinese 
researchers see Xiaoyuan Dong, ‘Two-Tier Land Tenure System and Sustained Economic Growth 
in Post-1978 Rural China’, World Development 24(5), (1996), pp. 915-28. 
17
 Loren Brandt, Jikun Huang, Guo Li, and Scott Rozelle, ‘Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, 
Fictions and Issues’, China Journal 47, (2002), pp. 67-97. 
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productivity. Privatization will not make these areas produce any more food. Moreover, 
attempting to increase production in these areas will likely exacerbate the growing environmental 
crisis there caused by valiant, yet ill-fated, attempts to raise crops in areas poorly suited to it.  
Moreover, increasing the productivity of land has remained a major goal of central 
Chinese officials for decades. In contrast to the impression that China’s leaders since 1978 have 
committed to market forces in most aspects of economic life, top officials have taken proactive 
steps to ensure that China is self-sufficient by increasing domestic food production, even at the 
expense of efficiency. They do this in part to protect the country’s food security and preclude 
outside forces from leveraging the country’s vulnerable food supplies to pressure China. For these 
reasons, Chinese officials reacted defensively to Worldwatch Institute founder Lester Brown’s 
warnings, leveled in the mid-1990s, that China’s growing population will increase demand for 
food so much that it will starve the world, insisting that China could be self-sustaining in food 
production. However, with acres of China’s arable land being lost to rapid urbanization and 
environmental problems, achieving food self-sufficiency becomes all the more challenging.  
Part of the question has been the means to secure food self-sufficiency. Decades ago, 
China’s Communist Party chairman, Mao Zedong, attempted to accomplish this through via a 
“Great Leap Forward,” a strategy that starved tens of millions. The subsequent establishment in 
the 1980s of the HRS, which initially included subsidies for agricultural inputs and guaranteed 
purchase prices, combined with trade tariffs and quotas on many agricultural products, sparked 
rapid growth in agricultural production. While some feared that the reduction in scale of Chinese 
farms that occurred in the wake of the establishment of the HRS would undermine rural 
livelihoods, instead the policy spurred the agricultural sector to such an extent that the newly 
established institutions more than compensated for technical inefficiencies related to small scale 
 14
household-based farming.18 The farmers’ newly endowed rights to land, increases in government 
procurement prices, and favorable weather combined to help increase agricultural production 6.6 
percent on average annually between 1978 and 1984.19 However, with the subsequent lowering of 
procurement prices, losses of arable land, the shift of labor from farm to industry, and the general 
neglect of rural policy during Jiang Zemin’s era, productivity slackened. Now, with this new 
policy, President Hu Jintao and other top leaders are signaling an attempt to increase food 
production through scaled-up, modernized agriculture. Given the government’s concern that 
privatization would erode its control over land and ability to ensure adequate food production, the 
leaders are doing so without changing fundamental land use rights.  
 
Labor Efficiency and Labor Transfer 
A second major advantage cited by advocates of privatization is that, because land is 
distributed on a relatively egalitarian basis, the efficiency of labor is staggeringly low. Therefore, 
even if privatization would not facilitate significantly greater farm yields, then it would at least 
make production more efficient. It would do so by allocating land to those who can use it best, 
allowing substituting mechanization for labor, and freeing up labor for more productive 
activities.20 In a world that resembled the models of mainstream economists, privatization would 
                                                 
18
 Colin A. Carter, and Andrew J. Estrin, ‘Market Reforms Versus Structural Reforms in Rural 
China’, Journal of Comparative Economics 29(3), (2001), pp. 527-541.  
19
 Shujie Yao, ‘Economic Growth, Income Inequality and Poverty in China under Economic 
Reforms’, Journal of Development Studies 35(6), (1999), pp. 104-130. 
20
 See for example Dwayne Benjamin and Loren Brandt, ‘Property Rights, Labour Markets, and 
Efficiency in a Transition Economy: The Case of Rural China’, Canadian Journal of Economics 
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indeed likely increase efficiency; however, even with pristine markets, production will not be 
more efficient in a way that helps China or its farmers. Economists measure efficiency as a ratio 
of output over input. If output cannot increase much, efficiency will increase primarily through a 
reduction of inputs. Since Chinese farms nearly maximize output per unit of land, the only way to 
increase efficiency is to reduce inputs. The input in question is that of labor. By eliminating 
collective land ownership, employers can reduce the amount of total labor allocated to a plot of 
land. It will also put employers in a strong position to bargain for cheaper labor costs. Thus, 
increasing efficiency in this way will not raise China’s agricultural output, but will only result in a 
change in the sharing of agricultural profit: beefing up the bottom line of agribusinesses and farm 
employers, but eroding the economic and social positions of China’s farmers, rendered redundant 
for agricultural production.  
Similarly, advocates for privatization argue that the substitution of labor with 
mechanization will allow surplus rural labor to be released from agriculture and enter into more 
rewarding non-farm employment. However, under the current system, there is already little 
constraining rural laborers from moving to non-farm jobs. The transfer of rural labor to non-farm 
jobs in China over the past thirty years has been a demand driven process. Thanks to the 
entitlement to land provided under the collective ownership, Chinese farmers would not be forced 
off their land (except in situations of illegal land grabs, an issue we address below). They would 
only leave farming when there were better alternatives in the non-farm sector. Thus, the pulling 
                                                                                                                                                               
35(4), 2002, pp. 689-716 and Justin Yifu Lin, ‘Rural Factor Markets in China: After the 
Household Responsibility Reform’, in Bruce Reynolds and Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., Chinese 
Economic Policy: Economic Reform at Midstream, (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 169-
203. 
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force of demand for labor in non-farm sectors has been driving the labor transfer. As a result, 
people who could find better non-farm jobs most likely have already done so. Those staying in 
farming are either efficient producers who can do better with farming, or have no attractive 
alternatives. Being laid off the land involuntarily would certainly not be a favorable situation for 
most of them. 
Moreover, it is likely that efficiency gains from privatization are not likely to be that 
dramatic. Partly this is because many Chinese villages have already established institutions that 
help to make farm production more efficient. First, even with low-scale land usage, villagers have 
been quite entrepreneurial, developing schemes to rent or share farming equipment, for instance. 
Second, because the village collective can coordinate land transfers, thus decreasing transaction 
costs, the current system allows efficiency-inducing transfers to occur.21 This suggests that gains 
to efficiency, seen as the trump card of advocates of privatization in China, are also exaggerated.  
 
Scaling-up and Modernization of Agriculture 
In addition to these local institutions, two major changes have facilitated the 
commercialization of Chinese agriculture and the penetration of urban capital into the agrarian 
system. First, while rural residents are not permitted to buy and sell their land, China’s farmers 
have for years been able to use rental markets to transfer land use rights to other farmers, thereby 
increasing the scale of production. Formal rental markets were already well established 
throughout much of China, even before such rights were codified into Chinese law since 2002. 
Strikingly, the “new” pronouncements emerging from the recent party conference that were taken 
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 Loren Brandt, Jikun Huang, Guo Li, and Scott Rozelle, ‘Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, 
Fictions and Issues’, China Journal 47, (2002), pp. 67-97. 
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to presage a liberalization of property rights were in fact word-for-word the same as the 2002 law. 
Chinese farmers, for their parts, are indeed taking advantage of rental markets. By 1995, more 
than 70 percent of villages surveyed reported unrestricted rights to rent cultivated land. Moreover, 
these rental markets are increasing in strength: whereas only 0.6 percent of land surveyed had 
been rented in 1988, by 1995, 75 percent of surveyed villages reported that at least modest 
amounts of land had been rented from one farmer to another.22 As early as 2001, in many counties 
in the relatively wealthy coastal province of Zhejiang province, rural households have transferred 
as much as 60 percent of farm land to others.23 Since households retain control over the land and 
can under normal circumstances claim back the land when the rental tenure is over, renting of 
land is distinct from selling. Thus, given the flaws of land privatization in economies 
characterized by subsistence agriculture, rental markets may be a good alternative for achieving 
relatively efficient results.24 
Second, Chinese farmers are increasingly entering a variety of arrangements with 
agribusiness that have led to an increase in scale of production even within the current system. 
According to research conducted in five Chinese provinces (Fujian, Heilongjiang, Henan, 
Shandong and Yunnan), many agricultural products are being produced on an impressive scale, 
and plantations nearing 10,000 mu (667 hectares) employing thousands of rural workers are 
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 Ibid. 
23
 Q. Forrest Zhang, Qingguo Ma and Xu Xu, ‘Development of Land Rental Markets in Rural 
Zhejiang: Growth of Off-farm Jobs and Institution Building’, The China Quarterly 180, (2004), 
pp. 1040-62. 
24
 Xiaoyuan Dong, ‘Two-Tier Land Tenure System and Sustained Economic Growth in Post-1978 
Rural China’, World Development 24(5), (1996), pp. 915-28. 
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already being formed. These steps away from small-scale agriculture represent revolutionary 
changes in China’s agriculture sector. Within these arrangements, farmers adopt a variety of roles 
– from commercial and entrepreneurial farmers, to rural workers with various relationships vis-à-
vis agribusiness. These relationships between farmers and agribusiness firms are shaped by rural 
China’s system of collective land ownership and individualized land use rights in ways that 
benefit the farmer. The separation of individualized land use rights from collective ownership 
facilitates the circulation of land and the consolidation of parcelized land into larger operations, 
paving the road for the scaled-up production needed by agribusiness.  
However, unlike other systems that encourage scaling up, Chinese farmers retain an 
element of power in their dealings with agribusiness by leveraging their household’s land use 
rights as a bargaining chip. This would be largely absent in a liberalized system which would do 
away with land use rights in favor of alienable property rights. In this way, far from representing 
an irrevocable loss of scale, the HRS has proven to be not only adaptable but actually conducive 
to the development of rural markets and agricultural modernization. Moreover, it does this in a 
way that leaves Chinese farmers more powerful than their counterparts in most other parts of the 
developing world. By contrast, eliminating land use rights, or allowing the sale of such rights, will 
reduce the political power of farmers in their negotiations with agribusinesses and local 
government officials.25  
In short, in China today, the traditional household-based subsistence or small-scale 
commercialized agriculture is rapidly shifting to one of larger scale, specialized, commercialized 
production. In this way, many of the purported benefits from privatization – that of increasing 
productivity and efficiency through scale – have already been accomplished within the present 
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system. Moreover, the argument that land markets improve efficiency ignores the issue of local 
political power. In other contexts, land sales often do not improve efficiency because local elites 
use their disproportionate political power to acquire additional land, as opposed to the ideal in 
which the most productive actors acquire this input.26 By contrast, because changes are already 
occurring under the dual track system, and without the land being privatized, China’s farmers 
have been able to leverage their usage rights to become primary beneficiaries of these changes. 
Thus, while many of the problems related to scale and productivity in China have been addressed, 
this has occurred without many of the tumultuous upheavals that would likely occur if China 
privatized land.  
 
Farmers’ Rights 
A fourth advantage cited by advocates of privatization is that of strengthening the 
institutional framework for protecting farmers’ rights. The rights of China’s farmers are directly 
threatened by unlawful land grabs by corrupt local officials and rapacious businessmen.27 These 
land grabs are often linked with efforts to develop rural areas. Local government officials claim 
land for often unproductive development schemes, and in many cases do not compensate farmers 
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fairly. Local unrest ensues, worrying central leaders nervous about restive peasants. Besides 
protesting locally, rural residents sometimes turn to the relatively trusted central government as a 
last resort.28 Moreover, many local governments have responded by detaining protestors in or on 
the way to file complaints in Beijing. This de facto system is inefficient, ineffective and has 
overloaded central institutions. Central party leaders thus are hoping the current policy will 
strengthen the rights of rural residents vis-à-vis powerful local actors. Privatization, according to 
its advocates, would better protect the rights of farmers because formal legal rights and official 
documents would increase the difficulty of local officials seeking to obtain land illegally. Land 
usage would no longer rely on a fuzzy and ill-defined norm tying land use rights to rural 
residency, but would fit within China’s rapidly institutionalizing regime of protecting private 
property.29  
Although we share the sympathy for the hardship and injustice that is experienced by 
many dispossessed farmers, we think this argument of attributing the persistence of illegal land 
grabs to the “ill-defined and ambiguous” collective land ownership is fundamentally flawed. First, 
rural land rights in China are not ill-defined or ambiguous as some critics claim.30 On the 
contrary, all rural residents and other involved parties in land grabs or other disputes know clearly 
that rural land is collectively owned by the villages (or villagers’ groups in some cases) and that 
to turn it into non-farm uses, certain legal procedures (such as official expropriation by the state 
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and due compensation to rural residents) are to be followed. Corrupt officials and developers grab 
land from farmers, not because they do not know farmers have land rights or the rights are ill-
defined, but because they have the power to violate such rights nonetheless. In fact, the prevalent 
frameworks used in studying farmers’ resistance to illegal land grabs—“rightful resistance” 
proposed by O’Brien and Li and “resistance by law” proposed by Chinese scholar Yu—both 
emphasize that farmers are fully aware what their rights are and use the laws that define and 
protect their rights as the weapon in their resistance.31 If land rights were indeed ill-defined and 
ambiguous under the current collective system, then how could farmers claim their resistance to 
be “rightful” and by what “law” could they use to support their resistance?  
The difference between the current collective ownership and the proposed private 
ownership of land is not that the latter is less ambiguous and more clearly defined than the 
former—both are equally unambiguous and well defined, the difference is who the owner is: a 
collective body of rural residents for the former and one individual or a household for the latter. 
Conceptually and legally, collective ownership is no different from a joint ownership by a couple 
or a family: no single individual can unilaterally dispose of the property. The unwillingness to 
accept any form of property ownership other than private ownership as unambiguous and well-
defined reflects the ideological bias of some critics more than anything else. If there is anything 
that is ambiguous or insecure under the current system, it is to which particular piece of land a 
rural household’s land use rights are attached, as the collective authority may reallocate land 
among village members. While this ambiguity may affect how households use the land in farming 
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production, it is only an internal ambiguity among members of the collective regarding the 
distribution of use rights and has no bearing on the exclusivity of the collective ownership to 
outside parties.32  
As the term “illegal land grabs” already makes abundantly clear, these land dispossessions 
are illegal because they violate existing laws, not because there is no law defining and protecting 
farmers’ land rights under the collective system. Clearly, the problem is not caused by the 
collective ownership, but rather by the absence of rule of law in local China. Yet, the argument 
that privatized land ownership could afford farmers better protection of their rights is precisely 
predicated upon the assumption that the legal system in China would protect farmers simply 
because they have privatized land ownership. This is tantamount to thinking that if only I put my 
name on my wallet, then the thief would not steal it because the ownership is made apparent. If 
powerful actors can violate farmers’ collective rights over rural land under the current system, as 
long as the political and legal institutions that protect property rights and constrain these powerful 
actors remain underdeveloped, they can also violate the privatized ownership of individual 
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farmers.33 In fact, the collective ownership helps to create a community of stakeholders among 
the villagers, who are collectively affected by the dispossession of any individual member’s land. 
The collective ownership therefore binds the village into a collective agent that provides a base 
for stronger collective action and resistance. In this regard, the individualized private ownership 
may in fact destroy this community, erode the base for collective action, and weaken farmers’ 
capacity to launch collective resistance against illegal land grabs or other forms of violation of 
their land rights.  
In sum, in their simultaneous roles as regulators and judges, and acting in collusion with 
(or in some cases acting as) business owners, many local leaders charged with protecting farmers’ 
rights have failed to protect them, and even conspired to thwart those rights. Privatization, far 
from strengthening farmers’ hold over land, may instead create a legal framework that enhances 
the ability of local businesses and political elites to wrest farmland away from China’s already-
vulnerable farmers.  
Moreover, a move toward privatization would further erode the norms of land usage rights 
and collective ownership, which is currently tied to rural residency. Under the current system, 
land usage rights depend not on formal documentation, but rather on their status as rural residents. 
In our fieldwork in Yunnan, Shandong and other provinces, in light of media reports on illegal 
land grabs, we were surprised to have found that the norms of collective land remained strong. 
This is consistent with the surveys that find rural commitment to egalitarianism, particularly as a 
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basis for land allocation, to be strong in the countryside, with only a small minority of 
respondents advocating household ownership of land.34  
Yet, other researchers who focus on illegal land appropriation in China, cast doubt on the 
strength of these norms, at least among village and township officials who perpetuate the oft 
reported land grabs.35 The extent of illegal land grabs is difficult to determine; the state has been 
reluctant to publish official figures on the numbers of households involved in such incidents. 
Older state records suggest that between 1986-2005, some 40 million households lost their land, 
though estimates during this period range as high as 73.7 million households – implying that as 
many as 315 million individuals have been dispossessed.36 Yet, such estimates typically do not 
distinguish between institutionalized, legal land transfers that result from urbanization and 
development, and thus say little about the degree of dissatisfaction involved or about the state of 
norms regarding land use rights. Many legal land transferences, for instance, respect and 
compensate peasants for the land appropriation, including the provision of an urban residential 
permit, that until recently has been eagerly coveted. Moreover, the greatest pressure for the illegal 
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transfers of land occurs in those bounded intersections between urban sprawl and rural land where 
the gap between peasant compensation and real estate valuation is the highest.  If so, it is a 
minority of peasants who are ever affected by illegal land appropriation when compared to the 
larger Chinese rural population.37 Despite such caveats, it is clear that illegal land grabs exist, and 
are perpetuated by both village-level and township officials. Abuses range from outright illegal 
sale of rural land use rights to illegally withholding or diverting compensatory funds due to the 
dislocated peasants.38 Numerous media reports about protest actions against illegal rural land 
grabs in various parts of the country have continued to surface, even after the Rural Land 
Contracting Law (RLCL) was revised in 2003, which was supposed to protect peasants from such 
abuses.39  
                                                 
37
 See Michael Webber, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Modern China’, Dialectical Anthropology 
32, (2008), pp. 299-320; Peter Ho, ‘Land markets, property, and disputes in China’, in Max 
Spoor, ed., The Political Economy of Rural Livelihoods in Transition Economies: Land, Peasants 
and Rural Poverty in Transition, (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 200-224. 
38
 Kathy L. M. Walker, ‘From Covert to Overt: Everyday Peasant Politics in China and the 
Implications for Transnational Agrarian Movements’, Journal of Agrarian Change 8(2-3), (2008), 
pp. 462-488; Alvin Y. So, ‘Peasant Conflict and the Local Predatory State in the Chinese 
Countryside’, Journal of Peasant Studies 34(3-4), (2007), pp. 560-581. 
39
 From 2009 to 2010 alone, we have discovered no fewer than 25 separate reports filed by 
foreign reporters documenting rural protests that were sparked off by land grabs (see, for 
example, Chris Buckley, ‘China’s farmers mount movement against land grabs’, Reuters News, 3 
August 2010). Given that only a minority of aggrieved farmers protest as a last resort, cases of 
illegal land appropriation are likely to be greater in number than reported by the media. 
 26
To be sure, we have encountered farmers who complained bitterly at the deal that they 
received when their land was expropriated for urbanization (we also encountered farmers who 
liked their deals, especially the steady income and urban residence permit that this entailed). 
Surprisingly, however, in contrast to cases in which farm land was taken for urbanization or 
industrialization, we encountered no cases where farmland was taken from farmers by 
agribusinesses to form agricultural production bases. Moreover, interviews with government 
officials, company managers, entrepreneurs, scholars and farmers revealed the depth and strength 
of the norms and regulations protecting the rights of farmers to their land. Not only are such 
norms about the sanctity of farmers’ entitlement to farmland backed by formal regulations and 
traditional practices, they have also acquired moral weight. Many informants were even shocked 
at the idea of trying to remove the farmers from their land in order to pave the way for larger-
scale agribusiness. Indeed, while the current system does limit the ability of agribusiness to obtain 
land, agribusiness still pursues its interest through dealing with farmers. Otherwise, the different 
relationships between agribusiness and farmers would not have emerged. If agribusiness could 
easily attain access to land, there would be little need for them to establish alternative and not 
necessarily advantageous relationships with the holders of land use rights. 
In any case, the question is less whether land grabs, caused by rapacious local officials, 
are happening. The key issue is how best to protect farmers. The recently released policy 
recognizes that bolder efforts are needed to improve the protection of farmers’ rights, and will be 
implementing some measures, such as broadening political participation, to keep local authorities 
in check. While central leaders have shown concern for these illegal land grabs, they recognize 
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that they have only been able to redress a portion of these cases and only in a stopgap fashion.40 
Hence the government hopes to enhance local autonomy in the villages, and ensure that more 
direct, fair and orderly elections are held to allow the peasants to choose their representatives. The 
new policy also calls for greater transparency of public affairs, especially public finances, so as to 
encourage public scrutiny and wider public discussion that will help to restrain government 
excesses. Even if this approach is mainly rhetorical, it underscores that central party officials has 
recognized the problem. Whether or not the central government can redress this issue, we fear that 
de-linking farmers from land use rights would worsen the problem, because it would become 
normal for farmers to be landless in China.  
 
Rural Livelihoods  
A fifth advantage of privatization would be to improve the material situation of rural 
residents. As mentioned earlier, due in part to high government purchasing prices and guaranteed 
purchases of agricultural surpluses, poverty in early years of the reform declined at a pace that 
stands among the world’s most rapid reduction of poverty. According to most measures, China’s 
headcount poverty rate declined rapidly from 1978 to 1984, and the urban-rural rich-poor gap 
declined for a brief period.41 However, when these policies were scaled back or withdrawn, the 
pace of poverty reduction flattened out between 1984 and 1989. With growing protests 
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throughout rural China being tied to the groaning gap between rich and poor, an urgent issue is to 
discover ways to not only further reduce poverty, but also to ensure that rural residents obtain 
their fair share of China’s prosperity or are at least protected from vulnerability related to volatile 
markets.  
One of the current system’s shortcomings is the lack of capital directly accessible to the 
peasants. This is a major problem in nearly all agricultural systems characterized by small-scale 
landholdings – it is difficult and costly for institutional lenders to lend. Proponents of 
privatization argue liberalizing the system would help farmers by providing a form of collateral 
that they can borrow against. Under the current system, farmers cannot use their land to borrow 
against, and have little else to use as collateral. Privatization would allow farmers to leverage 
against this asset, providing them much needed capital to invest in productive assets. 
Critics of privatization counter by noting that, more than collateral, it is high costs that 
often prohibit formal lenders from lending to disperse, small-scale borrowers. For this reason, the 
major beneficiaries of the ability to use land as a loan guarantee would likely be often-rapacious 
local money lenders charging predatory interest rates. Moreover, the tiny plots of land that most 
households control are typically not very valuable, and would thus not generate much capital 
through loans. In addition, even if farmers could borrow from sources, whether formal or 
informal, it would likely contribute to landlessness in China. Small-scale farmers are especially 
vulnerable to bad weather, chronic illness, slumps in demand, rising costs of inputs and other 
shocks. During these inevitable downturns, farmers with few other assets to service the loan face 
foreclosure on their land and, ultimately, landlessness. In many other countries, in such battles 
pitting powerful corporations against unorganized small farmers, the rise of agrarian capitalism 
proceeded in a Grapes of Wrath fashion, with capital owners consolidating land through 
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dispossessing smallholding farmers.42 Fieldwork in 2010 to India, which lacks an equivalent to 
the HRS, quickly revealed that land is readily available for sale from poor peasants forced to sell 
due to expensive social obligations or unfortunate circumstances. These kinds of ‘distress sales’ 
are prevalent even in the states of Punjab and Gujarat, areas that are renown as relatively 
successful in agriculture. Thus, in China’s case, we fear that farmers who borrow against their 
land, like many of their counterparts in India, will lose it when they cannot pay loans due to bad 
weather or bad fortune just as happens in many countries lacking land use rights. In this way, the 
very advantage which advocates of privatization cite – that of being able to use the land as 
collateral to obtain loans – may become a mechanism that will enable banks, corporations, 
landlords and other powerful actors in the countryside to legally dispossess farmers of their land. 
The government appears to have recognized the credit problem facing rural China. One of 
the important elements of the new central policy is to expand rural finance, broadening its reach 
to the peasants. Specifically, the government plans to provide tax rebates and subsidies to attract 
more capital investments in the villages, and to facilitate the development of more small and 
medium banks in the rural areas. The government hopes that, with greater access to capital, 
farmers themselves will be able to invest in larger-scale, commercialized production while 
retaining control over their household land and labor. This goal might not be unreasonable: our 
fieldwork in rural China has already uncovered entrepreneurial and commercial farmers who have 
diversified and expanded their production, even without much support from formal lenders. If 
successful, this approach would empower these small farmers, reducing the ability of more 
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wealthy or powerful actors from dominating or exploiting them. A more pro-poor, inclusive form 
of modern agriculture can hence be achieved.  
In addition to expanding credit to farmers, the government’s answer to the problem of 
rural lending would be to expand micro-financing services. One advantage of micro-finance is its 
ability to penetrate into the most undeveloped areas. The availability of micro-finance also means 
that peasants will be able to obtain capital without having to use their land as collateral. This 
would reduce the risks that they have to undertake, and serve to ensure that the farmers will not 
end up landless should their crops fail. Small financing groups will be able to obtain capital from 
financial institutions, and qualified peasants will be permitted to establish their own micro-credit 
cooperatives. The proposed development of the rural insurance market will also help to reduce the 
vulnerability and insecurities that peasants face by providing a greater range of agricultural-
related insurance and risk management schemes. While micro-finance has been subject to 
increasing criticism and the model has not worked as well in China as it has in other developing 
countries, it may have untapped potential to bring additional credit to China’s farmers. 
Related to farmers’ livelihoods, advocates for privatization argue that, by owning their 
land, farmers will be buffered in times of disaster. Natural disasters periodically plague China’s 
countryside, making China’s farmers vulnerable to forces outside their control and often less 
willing to take risks. The credit that could be extended to farmers using their private land as 
collateral would help farmers weather these bad times, helping to reduce vulnerability and periods 
of acute impoverishment. However, it is precisely during those situations that farmers will be 
most vulnerable to being dispossessed from their land. Moreover, under times of economic stress 
or natural disaster, when most farmers will be seeking relief, the price of land, typically not 
substantial in normal times, will likely plummet. By contrast, enhancing social welfare provisions 
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and improving China’s disaster management systems, would be a superior policy tool to ensure 
that the peasants attain a minimum level of well-being. In this regard, China’s new central 
agriculture policy advocates enhancing six main aspects of social well-being – cultural 
development, education, health, social security, basic infrastructure and environmental 
conservation. For example, equal opportunities to education will be ensured for children from 
low-income families, especially girls. Healthcare would be made more accessible with the 
establishment of at least one healthcare institution in each town or township. Access to emergency 
relief will be improved to provide greater security for those who are most vulnerable to natural 
disasters. Basic infrastructure such as water facilities, communication lines, postal services, roads 
and transport will be expanded to improve the livelihoods of the peasants as well as to support 
rural development.43 These initiatives, combined with augmented disaster management systems, 
will render farmers less vulnerable in the first place. 
 
Migration and Urban Integration 
A sixth argument for privatization is that the current system binds farmers to the land, 
makes them reluctant to abandon their land rights to transfer to non-farms jobs and hinders their 
integration into urban society. While more than one hundred million farmers have transferred 
from the countryside to the city, this process has been anything but smooth given the 
discrimination and repression that is common in most Chinese cities. Moreover, despite labor 
shortages in some areas, there is still a great deal of surplus farm labor remaining in the 
countryside. In light of these twin challenges, privatization would encourage rural residents to 
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transfer to cities and integrate themselves as permanent members of urban society, not as ‘blind 
flows’ of temporary rural labor. As it is, many farmers are reluctant to leave the countryside, 
fearing that the collective will reallocate their land to others during their absence. Secure property 
rights will ameliorate these concerns. Many migrants want to abandon their land in favor of far 
more attractive and lucrative opportunities in the cities. Under the current system, abandoning 
land outright means such families receive no compensation for the land they had been allocated – 
it is simply reallocated to other members of the collective. Private property rights would allow 
them to receive payment for their land, thus removing a disincentive for migration.   
We disagree with this line of argument for a number of reasons. First, land use rights have 
not represent much of a deterrent to migration. Many migrants are surplus laborers from farming 
families – often it is the young son or daughter that migrates into the city, leaving parents behind 
to farm their allocated land. Even when entire families migrate, they will rent, either through 
formal contracts or handshake deals, their land to friends and relates. Those cases where families 
abandon their land entirely suggest that the opportunities they discovered already outweigh any 
ties to the land. Second, much of the labor that can shift out of agriculture has already done so. 
The remaining labor, by and large, is poorly educated, in poor health, elderly or otherwise poorly 
qualified for even so-called ‘low skill’ manufacturing and service jobs in the city. Such people 
have few alternatives to farming. It is more the mismatch between the requirements of the job 
opportunities available and the qualifications of the farmers, rather than land use rights, that has 
prevented further labor from migrating to cities. Third, the difficulties many qualified farmers 
have had in integrating into urban societies is not so directly linked to land rights, but rather 
related to harsh, discriminatory and often punishing social policies. These are linked to China’s 
notorious household registration system – not the household responsibility system – that makes 
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legal distinctions between rural and urban residents, relegating the former as second-class citizens 
and preserving a set of privileges granted exclusively to the former.44  
Fourth and finally, in light of the 20 million urban migrants being thrown out of work, 
according to government statistics, we argue that land use rights may instead encourage 
migration. Having land back home that they may have rented to friends, relatives or neighbors 
provides a hedge or form of insurance that not only emboldened potential migrants to migrate 
during previous periods, but also served as a safety net when urban jobs disappear. While no one 
pretends that the transition, hopefully temporary, will be an easy one, Chinese farmers are 
fortunate that they, on the whole, have land to which to return – many of their counterparts in 
other similar nations do not. Land as a form of social safety net undoubtedly reduces already 
tenuous social rifts. It will not be easy for anyone laid off during hard economic times, and 
migrants throughout the world are especially vulnerable. However, the majority of migrants – 
though of course not all – in China have either land or income from their land use rights that will 
keep them from desperation in case of temporary or long-term job loss. Given the precarious 
climate that pervades many rural areas in China, it is important that it remains this way. Due to 
the HRS, China is in a position, all but unique among developing countries, because many 
migrant workers have a place to go to dampen the disruptions of joblessness.  
The government’s new policy addresses actual disincentives to migrate by strengthening 
laws that protect the rights of the rural migrants, and attempting to close the gap in living 
standards between the rural migrants and urban locals. The government also plans to speed up the 
process through which rural migrants with stable employment can obtain permanent resident 
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status in the cities in which they work. Additionally, the government is also attempting to enhance 
urban-rural integration to facilitate the transfer of capital, skills and know-how from the cities to 
villages, thereby speeding up the process of agricultural modernization. 
 
Conclusions 
In sum, many of the ostensible advantages of privatization – that of raising agriculture 
output, increasing labor efficiency, promoting scaled-up and modernized farming, protecting 
farmers’ rights, improving farmers’ welfare, and promoting migration, urbanization and 
industrialization – are also explicitly delineated within central policy. The government aims to 
achieve these policy goals by operating within the framework of the current system. Thus, it is 
surprising that analysts and reporters, both inside China and without, have emphasized the 
policy’s supposedly radical new approach to land ownership (actually nothing new), while largely 
ignoring the other significant aspects of this policy.45  
Overall, proponents of privatization point to one of the bases of the market system, that of 
voluntary exchanges. Why should farmers be denied the right to sell their land if they want or 
need to? We would argue that many other rights are inalienable, and should not be allowed to be 
bought or sold. Americans are not allowed to sell their right to vote to others, and Canadians 
cannot give up their right to health care in exchange for cash – no matter how urgently needed. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, surveys indicate that farmers indeed do not want land to be 
privatized, largely preferring the egalitarian basis of the current system. Further, in conditions of 
poverty, where hunger is rife, a salient issue becomes how ‘voluntary’ exchanges actually are. In 
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situations where the rich and powerful can exploit the poverty of others, desperate people will do 
nearly anything. However, in selling their land, China’s farmers would be losing an important 
form of social insurance and diversification crucial for their long-term well-being, and often their 
only productive asset besides their labor.46 
Thus, privatization would alienate rural residents from one of the few rights that peasants 
retain from socialism. During the rule of Mao Zedong, the regime implemented a cradle-to-grave 
system wherein citizens would be fully employed, and tied with their ‘work-unit,’ they would 
receive all of the welfare benefits expected from socialism. Housing, health care, education, old-
age pensions and even leisure activities were all part of the iron rice bowl organized by the state. 
This legacy, far from a workers’ paradise in practice, has been in the past two decades nearly fully 
dismantled in favor of the market system, leaving many who are poorly positioned in the market 
hierarchy relying on a frayed and poorly institutionalized welfare system. More importantly, 
during this entire period, all of these privileges were reserved for urbanites only. Despite the 
pivotal role that peasants played as foot soldiers and leaders of the revolution, under China’s 
socialist system, access to land was essentially the one ‘right’ that all rural residents possessed. 
With the HRS at least, rural residents retain this one privilege over urbanites. Privatization, 
however, would remove land use rights in favor of property rights, which we have argued 
privilege the wealthy and powerful, and will likely exacerbate landlessness. One need only look 
to China’s cities for an example of this phenomenon. When China’s leaders marketized the 
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housing, education and employment system in urban China 1990s, only urban residents who were 
well-placed– either via human resource endowment or political power – were able to take full 
advantage. Marketization drove the rapid rise in many economic indicators in China, but these 
aggregate statistics concealed the yawning inequities that have emerged in China’s metropolises. 
Doing the same in rural China could possibly increase China’s GDP, but would do so only at the 
expense of the vast majority of more vulnerable rural residents. 
It is for these reasons that we disagree with most of the arguments that experts both within 
and outside of China have offered that the privatization of land, or allowing the sales of land use 
rights, would benefit China’s hundreds of millions of farmers, or even for the country itself. 
Examining some of the strongest arguments presented by advocates for land sales in China makes 
it clear that the benefits of this kind of policy are exaggerated, while the costs of such a move 
would be high. In addition, we argue that collective ownership protects agricultural producers, 
incompletely and to various degrees, from domination, exploitation and dispossession by outside 
capital. Nearly all of the companies that we interviewed in rural China expressed a desire to 
expand their production bases. The primary barrier to expanding these bases is the lack of land – 
or, put in another way, the difficulty in wresting control of collective land from rural households. 
In many other countries, battles pitting powerful corporations against unorganized small farmers 
have led to the dispossession of smallholding farmers. In China, farmers’ protected land rights 
represent a tool to resist pressure from companies. This is an imperfect tool, and the current 
policy avails to strengthen it. Nevertheless, because this tool is in place, agricultural 
modernization in rural China has progressed in more equitable ways. An army of landless 
vagabonds has not emerged. Privatization of land is not the answer to the problems of rural China. 
